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In order to support an "abu-
sive work environment" claim fbr
sexual harassment, a plaintiff need
not show that the conduct in ques-
tion affected the plaintiff's psy-
chological well-being or caused the
plaintiff to suffer injury. Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct.
367 (1993). In so holding, the
Supreme Court corrected a misin-
terpretation by the lower federal
courts of the standard to be applied
to this type of sexual harassment
claim.
Teresa Harris, a female man-
ager at Forklift Systems, Inc., was
regularly subjected to sexually sug-
gestive and offensive comments by
Charles Hardy, Forklift's presi-
dent. Despite Harris' complaints,
Hardy's conduct continued. After
two years of employment, Harris
quit herjob at Forklift and filed suit
in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennes-
see for sexual harassment under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Harris alleged that Hardy's
conduct created an abusive work
environment.
Although the district court
found this to be a "close case", it
denied Harris' claim. The court
focused on the absence of harm to
Harris' psychological well-being
and found that Hardy's comments,
though offensive, were not so se-
vere as to cause injury. Harris
appealed and in an unpublished
opinion, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit af-
finned. The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the inconsistent approaches
to such claims among the lower
federal courts.
The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether Ms. Harris was
required to demonstrate that the
conduct in question seriously af-
fected her "psychological well-be-
ing" or caused her to "suffer an
injury." The Court first empha-
sized that Title VII is violated when
the discriminatory conduct is"' suf-
ficiently severe or pervasive [as] to
alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive
working environment. "' Id. at 370
(quoting Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). The
Court recognized that while Title
VII does not proscribe merely of-
fensive conduct, neither does it re-
quire the plaintiff to demonstrate
tangible psychological injury. Id.
An abusive work environment ex-
ists where both a reasonable per-
son would perceive the working
environment as hostile, and the vic-
tim subjectively perceives it as such.
Id.
However, the Court noted that
"Title VII comes into play before
the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown." Id. An abu-
sive work environment can detract
from an employees performance
without affecting the employee's
psychological well-being. id. at
370-71. Thus, the district court
erred by relying on the absence of
injury to Harris' psychological
well-being as determinative of her
claim. The Court concluded that
the district court had misinterpreted
Meritor, a case where the harass-
ing conduct was so severe that the
emotional and psychological sta-
bility of the minority workers was
virtually destroyed. Id. Based on
the facts of Meritor, the district
court erroneously concluded that
psychological harm was a prereq-
uisite to an abusive work environ-
ment claim.
The Court also pointed out
that the district court's conclusion
was not supported by the language
of Title VII. According to the
Court, "[s]o long as the environ-
ment would reasonably be per-
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ceived, and is perceived, as hostile
or abusive... there is no need for
it also to be psychologically injuri-
ous." 1d. Determining that the
indices of an abusive work envi-
ronment claim are case specific,
the Court listed several factors to
consider including the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct, its
severity, whether it was physically
threatening or humiliating, and
whether it unreasonably interfered
with an employee's work perfor-
mance. Id.
Although the district court
found that Forklift's work envi-
ronment was not abusive and Har-
ris was not subjectively affected by
the work environment, the Court
felt that the district court's reliance
on the incorrect standard may have
influenced its determination. Id.
This was supported by the fact that
the district court reached this con-
clusion only after finding that Har-
ris suffered no psychological in-
jury. Therefore, the Court re-
manded the case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with its opin-
ion.
Justice Scalia, in a concurring
opinion, bemoaned the vague "abu-
siveness" standard and the poten-
tial litigation it would produce es-
pecially since a plaintiff need not
demonstrate any injury. Id. at 372.
Nonetheless, Scalia admitted that
due to the vague statutory lan-
guage of Title VII, the majority's
standard was the only apparent
alternative. Justice Ginsburg, in a
separate concurring opinion, as-
serted that the inquiry should focus
on whether the discriminatory con-
duct unreasonably interfered with
theplaintiff's ability to perform his
or her job. id.
In Harris, the Supreme Court
corrected a misinterpretation of the
Meritor standard by the federal
courts in abusive work environ-
ment cases. No longer can a court
require a showing of psychological
harm as a prerequisite to a claim
for sexual harassment. By so hold-
ing, the Court has removed a major
obstacle to plaintiffs seeking re-
dress for such claims. Thus, Har-
ris advances one of Title VII's
main purposes: to prevent discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex with
respect to the terms and conditions
of employment.
- Nicholas C. DeMattheis Jr.
Florence County School
Dist Four v. Carter:
PARENTS MAY BE
REIMBURSED FOR










Rejecting a school district's
claims that the selected private
school was not approved by the
state and that reimbursement would
be too burdensome, the Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision,
-held that a child's parents are not
barred from reimbursement be-
cause of non-compliance with the
Individuals with Disabilities Act
("IDEA"), 84 Stat. 175, as
amended,20U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)
(1988 & Supp. IV). Florence
County School Dist. Four v.
Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993).
Consequently, the Court declared
that 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) does
not apply to placements of children
in private schools by their parents.
Shannon Carter was classified
as learning disabled in 1985 while
attending a school as a ninth grade
student in Florence County School
District Four. Shannon's parents
("the Carters") met with school
officials to develop an individual-
ized education program ("IEP"),
as required under IDEA.
Shannon's parents were dissatis-
fied with the IEP that was formu-
lated and requested a hearing to
challenge its appropriateness.
Authorities on both the local and
state levels rejected the parents'
claim and concluded that the IEP
was adequate. In September 1985,
the Carters, without state approval,
enrolled Shannon at the Trident
Academy, a private school, from
which she ultimately graduated in
the spring of 1988.
The Carters filed suit in July
1986, claiming that the school dis-
trict breached its duty under 20
U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)by failingto
provide Shannon with a "'free ap-
propriate public education."' Id.
at 364 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(18) (1988 & Supp. IV)).
Shannon's parents also sought re-
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